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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Today we address whether one of New Jersey’s 
responses to the rise in active and mass shooting incidents in 
the United States—a law that limits the amount of ammunition 
that may be held in a single firearm magazine to no more than 
ten rounds—violates the Second Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  We conclude that it 
does not.  New Jersey’s law reasonably fits the State’s interest 
in public safety and does not unconstitutionally burden the 
Second Amendment’s right to self-defense in the home.  The 
law also does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause because it does not require gun owners to surrender 
their magazines but instead allows them to retain modified 
magazines or register firearms that have magazines that cannot 
be modified.  Finally, because retired law enforcement officers 
have training and experience that makes them different from 
ordinary citizens, the law’s exemption that permits them to 
possess magazines that can hold more than ten rounds does not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  
6 
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the 
law.    
 
I 
 
A 
 
Active shooting and mass shooting incidents have 
dramatically increased during recent years.  Statistics from 
2006 to 2015 reveal a 160% increase in mass shootings over 
the prior decade.  App. 1042.  Department of Justice and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) studies of active 
shooter incidents (where an individual is actively engaged in 
killing or attempting to kill people with a firearm in a confined, 
populated area) reveal an increase from an average of 6.4 
incidents in 2000 to 16.4 incidents in 2013.  App. 950, 953.  
These numbers have continued to climb, and in 2017, there 
were thirty incidents.  App. 1149, 1133.  In addition to 
becoming more frequent, these shootings have also become 
more lethal.  App. 906-07 (citing 2018 article noting “it’s the 
first time [in American history] we have ever experienced four 
gun massacres resulting in double-digit fatalities within a 12-
month period”).   
 
In response to this trend, a number of states have acted.  
In June 2018, New Jersey became the ninth state to pass a new 
law restricting magazine capacity.1  New Jersey has made it 
                                              
1 As of spring 2018, eight states and the District of 
Columbia had adopted bans on large capacity magazines.  Cal. 
Penal Code § 16740 (ten rounds); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202w 
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illegal to possess a magazine capable of holding more than ten 
rounds of ammunition (“LCM”).2  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-1(y), 
2C:39-3(j) (“the Act”).   
 
Active law enforcement officers and active military 
members, who are “authorized to possess and carry a 
handgun,” are excluded from the ban.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-
3(g).  Retired law enforcement officers are also exempt and 
may possess and carry semi-automatic handguns with 
magazines that hold up to fifteen rounds of ammunition.3  Id. 
at 2C:39-17. 
                                              
(ten rounds); D.C. Code § 7-2506.01(b) (ten rounds); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 134-8(c) (ten rounds); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law 
§ 4-305(b) (ten rounds); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140 §§ 121, 
131M (ten rounds); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00(23) (ten rounds); 
13 Vt. Stat. Ann.  4021(e)(1)(A), (B) (ten rounds for a “long 
gun” and fifteen rounds for a “hand gun”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
18-12-301(2)(a)(I) (fifteen rounds).   
2 Under the New Jersey statute, a “[l]arge capacity 
ammunition magazine” is defined as “a box, drum, tube or 
other container which is capable of holding more than 10 
rounds of ammunition to be fed continuously and directly 
therefrom into a semi-automatic firearm.  The term shall not 
include an attached tubular device which is capable of holding 
only .22 caliber rimfire ammunition.”  Id. at 2C:39-1(y).  Prior 
to the 2018 Act, New Jersey had prohibited LCMs holding 
more than 15 rounds of ammunition.  See id. (Jan. 16, 2018); 
id. (1990).   
3 To be exempt from the Act’s prohibition, a retired law 
enforcement officer must, among other things, follow certain 
procedures, qualify semi-annually in the use of the handgun he 
8 
The Act provides several ways for those who are not 
exempt from the law to comply.  Specifically, the legislation 
gives LCM owners until December 10, 20184 to (1) modify 
their LCMs “to accept ten rounds or less,” id. at 2C:39-19(b); 
(2) render firearms with LCMs or the LCM itself inoperable, 
id.; (3) register firearms with LCMs that cannot be “modified 
to accommodate ten or less rounds,” id. at 2C:39-20(a); 
(4) transfer the firearm or LCM to an individual or entity 
entitled to own or possess it, id. at 2C:39-19(a); or (5) surrender 
the firearm or LCM to law enforcement, id. at 2C:39-19(c). 
 
B 
 
On the day the bill was signed, Plaintiffs Association of 
New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs and members Blake Ellman 
and Alexander Dembrowski (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)5 filed 
this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Act 
violates the Second Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.  App. 46-64.  Plaintiffs also sought a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants Attorney General 
of New Jersey, Superintendent of New Jersey State Police, and 
the Chiefs of Police of the Chester and Lyndhurst Police 
Departments from enforcing the law.   
                                              
is permitted to carry, and pay costs associated with the semi-
annual qualifications.  Id. at 2C:39-6(l).   
4 The law gave 180 days from its June 13, 2018 effective 
date to comply. 
5 Both Ellman and Dembrowski have worked at gun 
ranges, and Dembrowski is a Marine Corps veteran.  App. 470, 
476.  
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The District Court held a three-day evidentiary hearing 
on the preliminary injunction request.  The Court considered 
declarations from witnesses, which served as their direct 
testimony, and then these witnesses were thoroughly 
examined.6  The parties also submitted various documents, 
including declarations presented in other cases addressing 
LCM bans, books and journal articles on firearm regulations, 
reports on the efficacy of the 1994 federal assault weapons ban, 
statistics about gun ownership and use, news articles about 
shooting incidents, FBI reports on active shooter incidents, 
historical materials on LCMs, and police academy training 
materials.7  The evidence disclosed the purpose of LCMs, how 
they are used, and who uses them. 
 
A magazine is an implement that increases the 
ammunition capacity of a firearm.  App. 128.  An LCM refers 
to a particular size of magazine.  App. 159.  LCMs allow a 
                                              
6 Plaintiffs offered expert witness Gary Kleck, Professor 
Emeritus at Florida State University.  Defendants offered three 
expert witnesses: (1) Lucy Allen, Managing Director of NERA 
Economic Consulting; (2) Glen Stanton, State Range Master 
for the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General Division of 
Criminal Justice; and (3) John Donohue, Professor of Law at 
Stanford Law School.   
7 The exhibits include writings from Christopher Koper, 
Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society at George Mason 
University, see App. 663-67, 768-72, 1047-50, 1051-59, 1060-
65, 1247-53, 1254-85, and David Kopel, Research Director at 
the Independence Institute, Associate Policy Analyst at the 
Cato Institute, and Adjunct Professor at Denver University 
Sturm College of Law, App. 654-59, 1233-46.   
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shooter to fire multiple shots in a matter of seconds without 
reloading.  App. 225, 865.  Millions of LCMs have been sold 
since 1994, App. 1266, and 63% of gun owners reported using 
LCMs in their modern sporting rifles, App. 516, 753.  LCMs 
often come factory standard with semi-automatic weapons.  
App. 656, 994-95.   
 
Gun owners use LCMs for hunting and pest control.  
App. 655.  LCMs have also been used for self-defense.  App. 
225, 844-51, 915-16, 1024.  The record does not include a 
reliable estimate of the number of incidents where more than 
ten shots were used in self-defense,8  but it does show that 
                                              
8 Allen testified that most defensive gun use involves 
the discharge of between two and three rounds of ammunition.  
App. 844-48.  Kleck acknowledged that there is no current 
estimate of the number of incidents where more than ten shots 
were used in self-defense, App. 240, but then relied on data 
from Allen to assert that 4,663 incidents of defensive gun use 
have involved more than ten rounds.  App. 239, 328.  This 
figure is based on an extrapolation.  As Amicus Everytown for 
Gun Safety explained, 
 
That number was reached by taking 
Kleck’s . . . out-of-date, 2.5 million defensive-
gun-uses number, multiplying that by his 
estimate of the percentage of defensive gun uses 
in the home, and then multiplying that by the 
percentage of such incidents found in the NRA’s 
[Armed Citizen] defensive-gun-use database in 
which more than ten shots were reportedly fired 
(2 of 411). [App. 328.]  This approach takes 411 
11 
LCMs “are not necessary or appropriate for self-defense,” 
App. 861, and that use of LCMs in self-defense can result in 
“indiscriminate firing,” App. 863, and “severe adverse 
consequences for innocent bystanders,” App. 1024. 
 
There is also substantial evidence that LCMs have been 
used in numerous mass shootings,9 App. 851-53, 909-10, 914, 
                                              
of what are certainly some of the most extreme 
and newsworthy cases of defensive gun [use] 
across a period of more than six years, [App. 69], 
and assumes that they are representative of all 
defensive gun uses.   
 
Amicus Everytown for Gun Safety Br. at 23-24 (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis in original).   Plaintiffs attempt to embrace 
a figure based on data they themselves challenged because the 
expert did not know the data compilation method, the data may 
not have been representative, and the search criteria were 
limited.  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Grewal, No. 
18-1017, 2018 WL 4688345, at *5, *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 
2018).  App. 73-81.   
9 As the District Court observed, some of the studies and 
articles use different definitions for the term “mass shootings,” 
which led it to give less weight to these materials.  See Ass’n 
of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 2018 WL 46888345, at *5, *8.  
For instance, Mother Jones has changed its definition of a mass 
shooting over time, setting a different minimum number of 
fatalities or shooters, and may have omitted a significant 
number of mass shooting incidents.  App. 90-102, 1037-38 
(noting deficiencies in Mother Jones report).  While it 
questioned the reliability of the statistics, the District Court did 
12 
967-88, 1024, 1042, 1057, 1118-26, 1165-71, and that the use 
of LCMs results in increased fatalities and injuries, App. 562.  
“[W]hen you have a high capacity magazine it allows you to 
fire off a large number of bullets in a short amount of time, and 
that gives individuals much less opportunity to either escape or 
to try to fight back or for police to intervene; and that is very 
valuable for mass shooters.”  App. 225, 865.  The record 
demonstrates that when there are pauses in shooting to reload 
or for other reasons, opportunities arise for victims to flee, as 
evidenced by the 2017 Las Vegas and 2013 D.C. Navy Yard 
shootings, App. 114, 914, 1045, or for bystanders to intervene, 
as in the 2018 Tennessee Waffle House shooting and 2011 
Arizona shooting involving Representative Gabrielle Giffords, 
App. 830, 1113. 
 
While a trained marksman or professional speed shooter 
operating in controlled conditions can change a magazine in 
two to four seconds, App. 109, 263-67, 656, 1027, an 
inexperienced shooter may need eight to ten seconds to do so, 
App. 114.  Therefore, while a ban on LCMs does not restrict 
the amount of ammunition or number of magazines an 
individual may purchase, App. 231, without access to LCMs, 
a shooter must reload more frequently. 
 
“[S]hooters in at least 71% of mass shootings in the past 
35 years obtained their guns legally,” App. 853, or from a 
family member or friend (as was the case with the Newtown 
shooter who took his mother’s lawfully-owned guns), App. 
190, 195, 486, and gun owners in lawful possession of firearms 
                                              
consider the specific incidents of LCM use described in the 
record.  Id. at *3.   
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are a key source of arming criminals through loss and theft of 
their firearms, App. 221-22, 800-01, 924-25. 
 
New Jersey law enforcement officers regularly carry 
LCMs, App. 116, 1102, and along with their retired 
counterparts, are trained and certified in the use of firearms, 
App. 143-46, 1101-02.  Law enforcement officers use certain 
firearms not regularly used by members of the military and use 
them in a civilian, non-combat environment.10  App. 137, 140, 
1103. 
 
After carefully considering all of the evidence and the 
parties’ arguments, the District Court denied the motion to 
preliminarily enjoin the Act.  The Court found the expert 
witnesses were credible but concluded that the testimony of 
certain experts was “of little help in its analysis . . . . [because] 
their testimony failed to clearly convey the effect this law will 
have on reducing mass shootings in New Jersey or the extent 
to which the law will impede gun owners from defending 
themselves.”  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. 
Grewal, No. 18-1017, 2018 WL 4688345, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 
28, 2018).  Specifically, the Court stated that although it found 
both Kleck and Allen credible, their testimony “relied upon 
questionable data and conflicting studies,” suggesting that both 
of the experts’ methodologies and conclusions were flawed.11  
Id.   
                                              
10 Because their duties require access to LCMs, active 
military members and active law enforcement officers are 
exempt from the ban.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-3(g). 
11 Our dissenting colleague is of the view that the 
District Court rejected all of the expert testimony offered 
14 
The District Court, however, considered other evidence 
in the record to reach its conclusion, see, e.g., id. at *6, *6 n.7, 
*12, that the Act was constitutional.  The District Court held 
that a “ban on magazines capable of holding more than ten 
rounds implicates Second Amendment protections,” id. at *11,  
but that it does not violate the Second Amendment.   
Specifically, the District Court held that the Act (1) should be 
examined under intermediate scrutiny because it “places a 
minimal burden on lawful gun owners,” id. at *13, and (2) “is 
reasonably tailored to achieve [New Jersey’s] goal of reducing 
the number of casualties and fatalities in a mass shooting,” id., 
based in part on evidence showing that “there is some delay 
associated with reloading, which may provide an opportunity 
for potential victims to escape or for a bystander to intercede,” 
id. at *12.  
 
The District Court also held that the Fifth Amendment 
Takings and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims 
lacked merit.  The Court concluded that the Takings claim 
failed because the modification and registration options 
“provided property owners with . . . avenue[s] to comply with 
the law without forfeiting their property.”  Id. at *16.  The 
Court also determined that the Act’s exemption for retired law 
enforcement officers did not violate Plaintiffs’ right to equal 
                                              
during the preliminary injunction hearing.  This does not 
accurately reflect the Court’s opinion.  The Court’s opinion 
shows that while it found the testimony of Kleck and Allen 
unhelpful, Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 2018 WL 
4688345, at *5, *7-8, it did not similarly critique Donohue and 
Stanton, id. at *5-7.  The Court relied upon evidence from 
Donohue, Stanton, and a myriad of other sources to reach its 
conclusion.  Id. at *3.  
15 
protection because law enforcement officers, in light of their 
“extensive and stringent training” and experience “confronting 
unique circumstances that come with being a police officer,” 
are different from, and hence not similarly situated to, other 
residents.  Id. at *14. 
 
After concluding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on their claims, the District Court stated 
that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the other requirements for a 
preliminary injunction, id. at *16, and denied their motion.  
Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
Plaintiffs do not advocate an absolutist view of the 
Second Amendment but believe that the State’s ability to 
impose any restriction on magazine capacity is severely 
limited.  Plaintiffs argue that the Act is categorically 
unconstitutional because it bans an entire class of arms 
protected by the Second Amendment, there is no empirical 
evidence supporting the State ban, and the rights of law abiding 
citizens are infringed and their ability to defend themselves in 
the home is reduced.  
 
On the other hand, the State asserts that it is imperative 
to the safety of its citizens to take focused steps to reduce the 
devastating impact of mass shootings.  The State argues that 
the Act does not hamper or infringe the rights of law abiding 
citizens who legally possess weapons. 
 
 
 
16 
II12 
 
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction 
is within the sound discretion of the district court.  Winter v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 33 (2008).  “We 
employ a tripartite standard of review for . . . preliminary 
injunctions.  We review the District Court’s findings of fact for 
clear error.  Legal conclusions are assessed de novo.  The 
ultimate decision to grant or deny the injunction is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.”  K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).13  
                                              
12 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1).  
13 Plaintiffs’ argument that the clear error standard does 
not apply to legislative facts and that the Court is not limited to 
the record below in adjudicating questions of legislative fact is 
unpersuasive.   
Legislative facts have been described as: (1) general 
facts or things “knowable to the industry at all relevant times,” 
In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1245, 1248, 1252 n.11 
(3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concurring); (2) facts that underlie 
a policy decision and “have relevance to legal reasoning and 
the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal 
principle or ruling by a judge or court in the enactment of a 
legislative body.”  Id. at 1248 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201, 
advisory committee note to subsection (a)); (3) facts not 
limited to the activities of the parties themselves that a 
government body may rely upon to reach a decision, see 
Omnipoint Communc’ns Enters., LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of 
17 
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movants must: 
demonstrate (1) that they are reasonably likely to 
prevail eventually in the litigation and (2) that 
they are likely to suffer irreparable injury 
                                              
Easttown Twp., 248 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2001); and (4) in 
the words of one academic, “social facts” known to society at 
large related to individual constitutional rights, Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional 
Rights Cases, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 1185, 1186-87 (1994). 
To the extent the record includes legislative facts, 
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the 
legislative facts New Jersey relied upon “could not reasonably 
be conceived to be true.”  In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d at 
1252 n.11 (holding that “[i]n an equal protection case, those 
challenging state law must convince the court that the 
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based 
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the 
governmental decisionmaker.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).  Moreover, many of the facts in this record 
do not fall into the category of legislative facts as they are not 
known to the general public.   For example, the amount of time 
needed to reload a magazine or the details of various active 
shooter incidents are not facts known to the general public.  
Accordingly, clear error review applies. 
Even if it were within this Court’s discretion to refrain 
from applying the clearly erroneous standard to legislative 
facts, we are not compelled to do so.  See Lockhart v. McCree, 
476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (declining to reach the standard 
of review issue for legislative facts at issue).  We therefore 
decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to review the District Court’s 
factual findings de novo.     
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without relief.  If these two threshold showings 
are made the District Court then considers, to the 
extent relevant, (3) whether an injunction would 
harm the [defendants] more than denying relief 
would harm the Appellants and (4) whether 
granting relief would serve the public interest. 
 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. 
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2002)); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 65.  A plaintiff’s failure to establish a likelihood of 
success on the merits “necessarily result[s] in the denial of a 
preliminary injunction.”  Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 
Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  On this factor, 
“a sufficient degree of success for a strong showing exists if 
there is ‘a reasonable chance or probability, of winning.’”  In 
re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).  Here, we must decide whether 
Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of showing that the Act 
violates the Second Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.  We consider each claim in turn. 
 
III 
 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  
U.S. Const. amend. II.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment protects the right of individuals to possess 
firearms and recognized that the “core” of the Second 
19 
Amendment is to allow “law-abiding, responsible citizens to 
use arms in defense of hearth and home.”  Id. at 628-30, 635 
(invalidating a statute banning the possession of handguns in 
the home).14   
 
We therefore must first determine whether the regulated 
item is an arm under the Second Amendment.  The law 
challenged here regulates magazines, and so the question is 
whether a magazine is an arm under the Second Amendment.  
The answer is yes.  A magazine is a device that holds cartridges 
or ammunition.  “Magazine,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/magazine (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018); App. 128 (describing a magazine as “an 
implement that goes into the weapon to increase the capacity 
of the weapon itself”).  Regulations that eliminate “a person’s 
ability to obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it 
impossible to use firearms for their core purpose.”  Jackson v. 
City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 
2014).  Because magazines feed ammunition into certain guns, 
and ammunition is necessary for such a gun to function as 
intended, magazines are “arms” within the meaning of the 
Second Amendment.  Id.; see also United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174, 180 (1939) (citing 17th century commentary on gun 
use in America that “[t]he possession of arms also implied the 
possession of ammunition.”).   
 
Having determined that magazines are arms, we next 
apply a two-step framework to resolve the Second Amendment 
challenge to a law regulating them.  United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).  First, we consider 
                                              
14 Heller’s teachings apply beyond the handgun ban at 
issue there.    
20 
whether the regulation of a specific type of magazine, namely 
an LCM, “imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”  Id.  Second, if 
the law burdens conduct that is protected by the Second 
Amendment, “we evaluate the law under some form of means-
end scrutiny.”  Id.  “If the law passes muster under that 
standard, it is constitutional.  If it fails, it is invalid.”  Id.     
 
A 
 
Under step one, we consider whether the type of arm at 
issue is commonly owned,15 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 90-91, 
and “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes,”16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.  The record shows that 
                                              
15 “Common use” is not dispositive since weapons 
illegal at the time of a lawsuit would not be (or at least should 
not be) in common use and yet still may be entitled to 
protection.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 
409 (7th Cir. 2015). 
16 This plain language from Heller makes clear that the 
Second Amendment, like all of the amendments in the Bill of 
Rights, is not limitless.  Aside from requiring consideration of 
whether the arm is typically possessed by law-abiders for 
lawful purposes, Heller also examines whether the weapon is 
“dangerous and unusual.”  554 U.S. at 627; Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d at 91; see also United States v. One (1) Palmetto State 
Armory Pa-15 Machinegun, 822 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(holding machine guns not protected because they are 
“exceedingly dangerous weapons” that are “not in common use 
for lawful purposes”).  While the record suggests that LCMs 
are not unusual, they have “combat-functional ends” given 
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millions of magazines are owned, App. 516, 753, often come 
factory standard with semi-automatic weapons, App. 656, are 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for hunting, pest-
control, and occasionally self-defense, App. 655, 554-55,17 and 
there is no longstanding history of LCM regulation.18  We will 
nonetheless assume without deciding that LCMs are typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and that 
they are entitled to Second Amendment protection.  See N.Y. 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 257 
(2d Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 
1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Heller II]. 
 
 
                                              
their capacity to inflict “more wounds, more serious, in more 
victims,” and because a shooter can hit “multiple human 
targets very rapidly,” Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 137 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
17 We are also mindful of Heller’s admonition that 
disproportionate criminal use of a particular weapon does not 
mean it is not typically possessed for lawful purposes.  N.Y. 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 256 
(2d Cir. 2015). 
18 LCMs were not regulated until the 1920s, but most of 
those laws were invalidated by the 1970s.  App. 1242-44.  The 
federal LCM ban was enacted in 1994, but it expired in 2004.  
App. 1244.  While a lack of longstanding history does not mean 
that the regulation is unlawful, see Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the lack of 
such a history deprives us of reliance on Heller’s presumption 
that such regulation is lawful.     
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B 
 
Assuming that the Act implicates an arm subject to 
Second Amendment protection, we next address the level of 
means-end scrutiny that must be applied.  Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d at 89.  The applicable level of scrutiny is dictated by 
whether the challenged regulation burdens the core Second 
Amendment right.  If the core Second Amendment right is 
burdened, then strict scrutiny applies; otherwise, intermediate 
scrutiny applies.19  See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  “At its core, the Second Amendment protects the 
right of law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous 
weapons for self-defense in the home.”  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 92 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635); see Drake, 724 F.3d at 
431 (declining to definitively hold that Second Amendment 
core “extends beyond the home”).  Thus, laws that severely 
burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense in the 
home are subject to strict scrutiny.  Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 
114, 138 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny where the law “does not severely burden the core 
protection of the Second Amendment”); N.Y. State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 260 (applying intermediate scrutiny 
where “[t]he burden imposed by the challenged legislation is 
real, but it is not ‘severe’” (citation omitted)); Fyock v. City of 
Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2015) (determining 
appropriate level of scrutiny by considering “how severely, if 
at all, the law burdens [the Second Amendment] right”); Heller 
                                              
19 Rational basis review is not appropriate for laws that 
burden the Second Amendment.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95-96.  
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II, 670 F.3d at 1261 (determining “the appropriate standard of 
review by assessing how severely the prohibitions burden the 
Second Amendment right”). 
 
1 
 
The Act here does not severely burden the core Second 
Amendment right to self-defense in the home for five reasons.  
First, the Act, which prohibits possession of magazines with 
capacities over ten rounds, does not categorically ban a class 
of firearms.  The ban applies only to magazines capable of 
holding more than ten rounds and thus restricts “possession of 
only a subset of magazines that are over a certain capacity.”  
Fyock, 779 F.3d at 999 (describing LCM ban as a restriction); 
S.F. Veteran Police Officers Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 18 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(emphasizing that the law was not “a total ban on all 
magazines” but “a total ban only on magazines holding more 
than ten rounds”); see also App. 159 (testimony explicitly 
addressing that the law “does not ban any particular class of 
gun” because “it just deals with the size of the magazine”).   
 
Second, unlike the ban in Heller, the Act is not “a 
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly 
chosen by American society for [self-defense in the home].”  
544 U.S. at 628.  The firearm at issue in Heller, a handgun, is 
one that the Court described as the “quintessential self-defense 
weapon.”  Id. at 629.  The record here demonstrates that LCMs 
are not well-suited for self-defense.  App. 225, 861, 863, 915, 
1024.   
 
Third, also unlike the handgun ban in Heller, a 
prohibition on “large-capacity magazines does not effectively 
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disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend 
themselves.”  Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262 (citing Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 97).  Put simply, the Act here does not take firearms 
out of the hands of law-abiding citizens, which was the result 
of the law at issue in Heller.  The Act allows law-abiding 
citizens to retain magazines, and it has no impact on the many 
other firearm options that individuals have to defend 
themselves in their home.20  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; App. 
230-32, 917-18.   
 
Fourth, the Act does not render the arm at issue here 
incapable of operating as intended.  New Jersey citizens may 
still possess and utilize magazines, simply with five fewer 
rounds per magazine.  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 2018 
WL 4688345, at *12; see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 
804 F.3d at 260 (“[W]hile citizens may not acquire high-
capacity magazines, they can purchase any number of 
magazines with a capacity of ten or fewer rounds.  In sum, 
                                              
20 Heller stated that “[i]t is no answer to say, as 
petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of 
handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long 
guns) is allowed.”  554 U.S. at 629 (emphasis omitted).  
However, as discussed above, the handgun ban at issue in 
Heller, which forbade an entire class of firearms, differs from 
the LCM ban here, which does not prevent law-abiding citizens 
from using any type of firearm provided it is used with 
magazines that hold ten rounds or fewer.  In fact, at oral 
argument, Plaintiffs were unable to identify a single model of 
firearm that could not be brought into compliance with New 
Jersey’s magazine capacity restriction, and even if such 
firearms exist, they simply need to be registered for owners to 
legally retain them.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-20(a). 
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numerous alternatives remain for law-abiding citizens to 
acquire a firearm for self-defense.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)).   
 
Fifth, “it cannot be the case that possession of a firearm 
in the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession 
under all circumstances.  By this rationale, any type of firearm 
possessed in the home would be protected merely because it 
could be used for self-defense.”  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94.   
 
For these reasons, while the Act affects a type of 
magazine one may possess, it does not severely burden, and in 
fact respects, the core of the Second Amendment right.  See 
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 258; Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 94 (observing that machine guns are not protected 
by the Second Amendment even though they may be used in 
the home for self-defense).  As a result, intermediate scrutiny 
applies.21 
                                              
21 No court has applied strict scrutiny to LCM bans, 
reasoning that the bans do not impose a severe or substantial 
burden on the core Second Amendment right.  Kolbe, 849 F.3d 
at 138; N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 260; Fyock, 
779 F.3d at 999; Heller II, 607 F.3d at 1262; see also Duncan 
v. Becerra, No. 17-56081, 2018 WL 3433828, at *2 (9th Cir. 
July 17, 2018) (holding district court did not abuse its 
discretion in applying intermediate scrutiny and considering 
whether the arm was in common use for lawful purposes).  
Four courts applied intermediate scrutiny, and one court upheld 
an LCM ban without applying any level of scrutiny.  Instead, 
it considered whether the banned weapon was “common at the 
time of the ratification,” had a relationship to “the preservation 
26 
2 
 
“[U]nder intermediate scrutiny[,] the government must 
assert a significant, substantial, or important interest; there 
must also be a reasonable fit between that asserted interest and 
the challenged law, such that the law does not burden more 
conduct than is reasonably necessary.”  Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 (requiring serial numbers on guns 
reasonably fits government interest).  The law need not be the 
least restrictive means of achieving that interest.  Drake, 614 
F.3d at 439.22 
 
                                              
or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” and whether law-
abiding citizens retained adequate means for self-defense.  
Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410. 
22 Our dissenting colleague seems to misunderstand the 
analytical approach that we have adopted and which is 
consistent with our precedent.  The dissent suggests that we 
engage in interest-balancing.  Our analysis demonstrates that 
we do not.  The scrutiny analysis described above is not the 
interest-balancing approach advocated by Justice Breyer and 
rejected by the Heller majority, where a court, focused on 
proportionality, weighs the government interest against the 
burden on the Second Amendment right.  554 U.S. at 634.  At 
the first step of Marzzarella, assessing the burden that this Act 
places on the core of the Second Amendment does not consider 
the government interest.  At the second step of Marzzarella, we 
identify a substantial government interest and whether the 
legislation is a reasonable fit for that interest.  There is no 
balancing at either step.   
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“The State of New Jersey has, undoubtedly, a 
significant, substantial and important interest in protecting its 
citizens’ safety.”  Id. at 437.  Given the context out of which 
the Act was enacted, this clearly includes reducing the lethality 
of active shooter and mass shooting incidents.  Thus, the State 
has asserted a qualifying interest. 
 
New Jersey’s LCM ban reasonably fits the State’s 
interest in promoting public safety.  LCMs are used in mass 
shootings.  App. 1057 (stating that “LCM firearms are more 
heavily represented among guns used in murders of police and 
mass murders”); see App. 269 (noting 23 mass shootings using 
LCMs), 1118-26 (describing weapons used in sixty-one mass 
shootings, eleven of which used fifteen-round magazines, two 
of which used thirteen, and two of which used fourteen round 
magazines).  LCMs allow for more shots to be fired from a 
single weapon and thus more casualties to occur when they are 
used.  App. 562 (noting, however, that this does not imply that 
LCMs “caused shooters to inflict more casualties”), 865, 895-
98.  By prohibiting LCMs, the Act reduces the number of shots 
that can be fired from one gun, making numerous injuries less 
likely.   
 
Not only will the LCM ban reduce the number of shots 
fired and the resulting harm, it will present opportunities for 
victims to flee and bystanders to intervene.  App. 919-20.  
Reducing the capacity of the magazine to which a shooter has 
access means that the shooter will have fewer bullets 
immediately available and will need to either change weapons 
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or reload to continue shooting.23  Weapon changes and 
reloading result in a pause in shooting and provide an 
opportunity for bystanders or police to intervene and victims 
to flee.  As the Commissioner of the Baltimore Police 
Department explained, if a shooter uses a ten-round magazine, 
rather than a 30, 50, or 100-round magazine, the chances to act 
increase:  
 
[u]se of ten-round magazines would thus offer 
six to nine more chances for bystanders or law 
enforcement to intervene during a pause in 
firing, six to nine more chances for something to 
go wrong with a magazine during a change, six 
to nine more chances for the shooter to have 
problems quickly changing a magazine under 
intense pressure, and six to nine more chances 
for potential victims to find safety during a pause 
in firing.  Those six to nine additional chances 
can mean the difference between life and death 
for many people. 
 
App. 865; see also Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 128 (same).   
 
                                              
23 While it is true that some active shooters carry 
multiple weapons, see App. 967-88 (describing active shooter 
incidents 2000-2013, some of which the shooter had rifles, 
handguns, and/or shotguns), 1141-46 (same for 2014-2015), 
1156-64 (same for 2016-2017), when those weapons are 
equipped with LCMs, there are more continuously-fired shots 
from each gun, which means fewer interruptions in the 
shooting.     
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This view is corroborated by other items in the record 
demonstrating that a delay occurs when a shooter needs to 
reload, see App. 114 (eight to ten seconds for inexperienced 
shooter or two to four seconds for trained shooter), and that 
such delay can be consequential.  Videos from the Las Vegas 
shooting in 2017 show that “concert attendees would use the 
pauses in firing when the shooter’s high capacity magazines 
were spent to flee.”  App. 914.  During the Navy Yard shooting, 
one victim had a chance to escape when the shooter was forced 
to reload.  App. 1045 (describing Navy Yard shooting where 
shooter attempted to kill a woman, was out of ammunition, and 
left to reload, at which time she found a new hiding spot and 
ultimately survived); see also App. 658-59, 1027 (describing 
escape during reloading in 2012 Newtown shooting).  There 
are multiple instances when individuals have intervened in 
mass shootings and active shooter incidents to stop the shooter.  
App. 830 (Waffle House shooting), 969 (Florida’s Gold Leaf 
Nursery shooting where “shooter was restrained by a citizen 
while attempting to reload his gun”), 1113 (Arizona’s Giffords 
shooting), 1142 (Seattle Pacific University shooting where 
shooter was confronted/pepper-sprayed by student while 
reloading).  While each incident may not have involved delay 
due to a need to reload, see App. 282 (distinguishing Waffle 
House incident on the basis that the intervener “said he didn’t 
know one way or another, and when he was interviewed the 
first possibility he offered was the guy’s – the shooter’s gun 
jammed”), it was the pause in shooting that allowed individuals 
and bystanders to act.  See App. 865, 979, 1142.  In light of 
this evidence, the District Court did not clearly err when it 
concluded that the evidence “established that there is some 
delay associated with reloading, which may provide an 
opportunity for potential victims to escape or for a bystander 
to intercede and somehow stop a shooter.”  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle 
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& Pistol Clubs, 2018 WL 4688345, at *12.  Therefore, the ban 
reasonably fits New Jersey’s interest.24  See Drake, 724 F.3d at 
437. 
                                              
24 Our dissenting colleague says that our analysis has 
placed the burden of proof on Plaintiffs.  That is incorrect.  The 
State bears the burden of proving that the Act is constitutional 
under heightened scrutiny.  Hassan v. City of New York, 804 
F.3d 227, 301 (3d Cir. 2015).  It has done so with appropriate 
evidence.  The record demonstrates concrete examples of 
intervention and escape permitted by pauses in reloading, 
including the episodes in Tennessee, Las Vegas, Florida, 
Newtown, D.C., Arizona, and Seattle.  App. 830, 914, 969, 
1027, 1045, 1113, 1142.   
The dissent prefers, and in fact insists, on a particular 
type of evidence, namely empirical studies demonstrating a 
causal link between the LCM ban and a reduction in mass 
shooting deaths.  This is not required.  First, intermediate 
scrutiny requires not a causal link but a reasonable fit between 
the ban and the State’s goal, and the record supports this 
reasonable fit.  As explained above, the LCM ban provides the 
circumstance that will enable victims to flee and bystanders to 
intervene, and thereby reduce harm.  Second, while in some 
contexts empirical evidence may be useful to examine whether 
a law furthers a significant government interest, Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (examining 
both statistical and anecdotal data in support of the 
University’s position), this is not the only type of evidence that 
can be used or is even necessary for a state to justify its 
legislation.  To take the dissent’s suggestion concerning the 
need for empirical studies to its logical conclusion, the State 
would have to wait for studies analyzing a statistically 
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significant number of active and mass shooting incidents 
before taking action to protect the public.  The law does not 
impose such a stringent requirement.    
Moreover, the dissent criticizes us for reviewing the 
entire record to determine whether the District Court clearly 
erred in its factual determinations, but clear error review 
requires it.  See In re Lansdale Family Rests., Inc., 977 F.2d 
826, 828 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that clear error review 
“requires us to determine whether, although there is evidence 
to support it, we are left with the definite and firm conviction 
from the entire record” that the court “committed a mistake of 
fact”).  When reviewing for clear error, we examine the record 
to determine if there is factual support for the District Court’s 
conclusion.  Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1125 (3d Cir. 
1987) (stating that “if a study of the record suggests the district 
court did not completely miss the mark in its conclusion that 
[the movant] is likely to succeed on the merits of her case, we 
must uphold the court’s finding on that criterion.”).  Because 
we are tasked with reviewing the record, we are not limited to 
the facts the Court specifically mentioned to determine if the 
factual finding is erroneous.  Indeed, it is often the case that a 
factual finding can be supported by various pieces of evidence, 
some of which may be mentioned and some of which may not.  
For example, the factual finding that pauses in shooting permit 
escape and intervention is borne out in the record by various 
eyewitness accounts, the declarations of law enforcement 
officers, and the twelve-minute video of the Las Vegas 
shooting, which has images of individuals fleeing the area 
during breaks in the shooting.   These are real events that 
provide real evidence that allow us to conclude that the District 
Court’s factual findings were not clear error. 
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Plaintiffs attempt to discount the need for the LCM ban 
by describing mass shootings as rare incidents, and asserting 
that the LCM ban burdens the rights of law-abiding gun owners 
to address an infrequent occurrence.25  The evidence adduced 
before the District Court shows that this statement downplays 
the significant increase in the frequency and lethality of these 
incidents.  See, e.g., App. 906, 1133-34; see also App. 1042-
43 (noting that pre-2015, there was never a year with more than 
five gun massacres, and 2015 had seven “massacres” as 
defined by Mother Jones, but acknowledging discrepancies 
with Mother Jones’ definition of massacre or mass shooting).  
                                              
25 Plaintiffs also argue that the LCM ban burdens the 
rights of law-abiding gun owners by depriving them of the 
tactical advantage that LCMs provide to criminals and law 
enforcement officers.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 11:17-
23, 13:3-19, 16:7-17:2, Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. 
v. Grewal, et al., No. 18-3170 (Nov. 20, 2018).  Plaintiffs’ 
expert testified that, given the average citizen’s poor shooting 
accuracy and the potential for multiple assailants, LCMs are 
important for self-defense.  App. 555, 655-56. 
We recognize that Heller instructs that the Second 
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home.”  554 U.S. at 635.  The Act here does not undermine 
this interest.  The record reflects that most homeowners only 
use two to three rounds of ammunition in self-defense.  App. 
626.  Furthermore, homeowners acting in self-defense are 
unlike law enforcement officers who use LCMs to protect the 
public, particularly in gunfights, App. 1103-04, or active and 
mass shooters who use their weapons to inflict maximum 
damage.  
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Despite Plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary, New Jersey has not 
been spared from a mass shooting.  Just days after the Act was 
passed, a mass shooter injured twenty-two individuals and 
killed one at an arts festival in Trenton.  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & 
Pistol Clubs, 2018 WL 4688345, at *3; App. 1288-95.  Even if 
this event had not occurred, “New Jersey need not wait for its 
own high-fatality gun massacre before curtailing access to 
LCMs.”  Giffords Law Ctr. Amicus Br. at 3; App. 247.   
 
Lastly, the Act does not burden more conduct than 
reasonably necessary.  As we have already discussed, the 
prohibition on LCMs does not disarm an individual.  While the 
Act does limit access to one tool—magazines that hold over 
ten rounds—it imposes no limit on the number of firearms or 
magazines or amount of ammunition a person may lawfully 
possess.26  In any event, the record does not show that LCMs 
are well-suited or safe for self-defense.27  App. 844-51, 861, 
                                              
26 The dissent incorrectly asserts that our analysis lacks 
a limiting principle.  We have a limiting principle and have 
applied it, namely whether the law severely and substantially 
burdens the core right to self-defense in the home.  See Drake, 
724 F.3d at 436; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; see also Kolbe, 
849 F.3d at 138.  Moreover, the only issue we are deciding is 
whether New Jersey’s limit on the capacity of magazines to no 
more than ten rounds is constitutional.  We rule on no other 
issue.   
27 Plaintiffs rely on evidence from Kleck to support their 
assertion that LCMs are needed for self-defense.  He asserts 
that attacks by multiple offenders are common, postulates the 
number of shots an average citizen, as compared to a proficient 
police officer, needs to shoot an offender, and then multiplies 
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863, 923, 1024.  Thus, the Act is designed to “remove these 
especially lethal items from circulation so that they will be 
unavailable, or at least less available, to mass murderers,” S.F. 
Veteran Police Officers Ass’n, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 1004; see also 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 
2015); App. 195, 221-22, 846, 800-01, 853, and it does not 
burden a gun owner’s right to self-defense, Drake, 724 F.3d at 
439 (upholding a gun law that “takes into account the 
individual’s right to protect himself from violence as well as 
the community at large’s interest in self-protection” and 
general public safety).  
 
For these reasons, the Act survives intermediate 
scrutiny, and like our sister circuits, we hold that laws 
restricting magazine capacity to ten rounds of ammunition do 
not violate the Second Amendment.28  See Kolbe, 849 F.3d 114 
                                              
that by four to conclude that average persons need more than 
ten rounds of ammunition to act in self-defense.  App. 555.  
This calculation is speculative. 
28 Plaintiffs argue that three First Amendment standards 
should be used to evaluate a Second Amendment challenge to 
a gun law, namely that: (1) the Act cannot regulate the 
secondary effects of gun violence by suppressing the right to 
possess firearms; (2) the Act must alleviate the harm it seeks 
to address; and (3) New Jersey was required to consider other 
less restrictive alternatives.  The dissent also applies First 
Amendment, as well as Equal Protection, articulations of the 
intermediate scrutiny test to the case before us.  The controlling 
case law, however, sets forth the governing law for evaluating 
Second Amendment challenges.     
35 
                                              
While our Court has consulted First Amendment 
jurisprudence concerning the appropriate level of scrutiny to 
apply to a gun regulation, see Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 
336, 345 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 
n.4, we have not wholesale incorporated it into the Second 
Amendment.  This is for good reason: “[t]he risk inherent in 
firearms and other weapons distinguishes the Second 
Amendment right from other fundamental rights . . . .”  Bonidy 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015).  We 
said in Marzzarella that the First Amendment “is a useful tool 
in interpreting the Second Amendment,” but we are also 
“cognizant that the precise standards of scrutiny and how they 
apply may differ under the Second Amendment.”  614 F.3d at 
96 n.15.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has also 
noted that there are “salient differences between the state’s 
ability to regulate” First and Second Amendment rights, and 
therefore, “it would be as imprudent to assume that the 
principles and doctrines developed in connection with the First 
Amendment apply equally to the Second, as to assume that 
rules developed in the Second Amendment context could be 
transferred without modification to the First.”  Kachalsky v. 
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(declining to adopt First Amendment prior restraint doctrine 
for public carriage restrictions).  For the same reasons, the 
articulation of intermediate scrutiny for equal protection 
purposes is not appropriate here.  Accordingly, we decline to 
deviate from the standards set forth in Drake and Marzzarella 
for considering a Second Amendment challenge.   
Even if we evaluated the First Amendment 
considerations Plaintiffs advocate, they do not change the 
outcome.  First, Plaintiffs rely on Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
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opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425, 445 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] city may 
not regulate the secondary effects of speech by suppressing the 
speech itself.”), to assert that the State impermissibly seeks to 
regulate secondary effects of gun violence by banning LCMs.  
Unlike the zoning ordinance in Alameda Books, the Act has 
the “purpose and effect” of enhancing public safety and 
reducing the lethality of mass shootings, it does not suppress 
the Second Amendment right.  Id. at 445.   
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Act must “in fact 
alleviate the problem meant to be addressed,” Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994), and may not 
simply be a predictive judgment to survive intermediate 
scrutiny.  The record here provides a basis to conclude that the 
Act would achieve New Jersey’s goal to protect public safety 
and reduce the lethality of active and mass shootings.  As we 
have already explained, the evidence shows that pauses in 
shooting, which would occur if a shooter needs to reload 
because he lacks an LCM, save lives.   
Third, Plaintiffs claim that New Jersey failed to 
consider any less restrictive alternatives in passing the Act and 
that this is fatal to the law’s survival.  In Bruni v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016), we examined a 
content-neutral speech regulation under intermediate scrutiny 
and considered whether the state “show[ed] either that 
substantially less-restrictive alternatives were tried and failed, 
or that the alternatives were closely examined and ruled out for 
good reason.”  Id. at 369; see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 
S. Ct. 2518, 2540 (2014).  To the extent we must examine 
whether the legislature considered less restrictive means, we 
can take into account that New Jersey has historically used gun 
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(upholding Maryland ten round limit); N.Y. State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 263-64 (upholding New York and 
Connecticut’s ten-round limit); Friedman, 784 F.3d at 411-12 
(upholding city’s ten-round limit); Fyock, 779 F.3d at 1000 
                                              
regulations to address public safety.  At the same time New 
Jersey enacted the LCM ban, it passed five other regulations, 
which focused on background checks, set mental health 
limitations, amended requirements for concealed carry, and 
prohibited armor piercing ammunition.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
2A:62A-16, 2C:39-1, 2C:39-3, 2C:58-3, 2C:58-4, 2C:58-20.  
A state is not required to choose a single avenue to achieve a 
goal and wait to see whether it is effective.  Further, one of the 
alternatives Plaintiffs suggest, limiting magazines to the home, 
is already addressed by New Jersey’s concealed carry law.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:58-4.  The other alternatives that Plaintiffs 
claim that New Jersey should have pursued, namely 
background checks and registration, Oral Argument Transcript 
at 9:7-19, would not address the fact that 71% of active and 
mass shooters were in lawful possession of the firearms that 
they used and thus these alternatives would have had no impact 
on them.   
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same)29; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262-64 (upholding D.C.’s ten-
round limit).30   
 
IV 
 
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Takings claim also fails.  
The Takings Clause provides that “private property [shall not] 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”31  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  “The paradigmatic taking requiring just 
                                              
29 In a more recent non-precedential opinion, a separate 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California’s order preliminarily enjoining California’s LCM 
ban, relying on the district court’s fact findings, which it 
properly recognized it could not reweigh.  See Duncan, 2018 
WL 3433828, at *1-2.  The district court had distinguished the 
evidentiary record before the Fyock panel, which issued a 
precedential opinion upholding analogous ban, as “credible, 
reliable, and on point.”  Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 
1106, 1120 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Fyock, 779 F.3d at 
1000).  Thus, Duncan seems to reflect a ruling based upon the 
evidence presented and not a general pronouncement about 
whether LCM bans violate the Second Amendment. 
30 The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts also rejected a Second Amendment challenge to 
Massachusetts’s LCM ban.  Worman v. Healey, 293 F. Supp. 
3d 251, 264-66 (D. Mass. 2018), appeal docketed, Worman v. 
Baker, No. 18-1545 (1st Cir. June 19, 2018).  
31 The Takings Clause applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
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compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical 
invasion of private property.”  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).  In addition, a government 
regulation “may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect 
is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster,” and “such 
‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment.”  Id.   
 
Here, the compliance measures in the Act do not result 
in either an actual or regulatory taking.32  There is no actual 
taking because owners have the option to transfer or sell their 
LCMs to an individual or entity who can lawfully possess 
LCMs, modify their LCMs to accept fewer than ten rounds, or 
                                              
32 New Jersey’s LCM ban seeks to protect public safety 
and therefore it is not a taking at all.  A compensable taking 
does not occur when the state prohibits the use of property as 
an exercise of its police powers rather than for public use.  See 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28, 1027 
n.14 (1992); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); 
Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 
63 (3d Cir. 2013).  We, however, need not rest on this ground 
to conclude that the Act does not violate the Takings Clause 
because it does not result in either an actual or regulatory 
taking.   
Plaintiffs assert that Horne v. Department of 
Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), dictates that the Act 
constitutes a taking.  We disagree.  Horne dealt with a taking 
involving property for government use.  Id. at 2425 (addressing 
constitutionality of a reserve requirement that grape growers 
set aside a certain percentage of their crop for the government 
to sell in noncompetitive markets).  The Act here does not 
involve a taking for government use in any way.   
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register those LCMs that cannot be modified.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2C:39-19, 2C:39-20.  With these alternatives, “[t]he ban 
does not require that owners turn over their magazines to law 
enforcement.”  Wiese v. Becerra, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1198 
(E.D. Cal. 2018); see Rupp v. Becerra, No. 8:17-cv-00746, 
2018 WL 2138452, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2018) (dismissing 
takings claim where “[t]he law offers a number of options to 
lawful gun owners that do not result in the weapon begin 
surrendered to the government”).   
 
The Act also does not result in a regulatory taking 
because it does not deprive the gun owners of all economically 
beneficial or productive uses of their magazines.  See Murr v. 
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) (stating that “a 
regulation which denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land will require compensation under the 
Takings Clause” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1030 (1992) (describing a “total taking” where a 
regulation “declares ‘off-limits’ all economically productive or 
beneficial uses of land”).  Simply modifying the magazine to 
hold fewer rounds of ammunition than before does not 
“destroy[] the functionality of the magazine.”  Wiese, 306 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1198 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, 
there is no assertion that a gun owner cannot use a modified 
magazine for its intended purpose.  A gun owner may also 
retain a firearm with a fixed magazine that is “incapable of 
being modified to accommodate 10 or less rounds” or one that 
only “accepts a detachable magazine with a capacity of up to 
15 rounds which is incapable of being modified to 
accommodate 10 or less rounds” so long as the firearm is 
registered.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-20(a).  Thus, owners may 
keep their unmodifiable LCMs and modified versions.  These 
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magazines may be used in the same way expected: to hold 
multiple rounds of ammunition in a single magazine.  In short, 
the Act does not result in a taking. 
 
V 
 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim fails.  The 
Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  “This is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike.”  Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 
F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).  Thus, to 
establish an equal protection claim, Plaintiffs “must 
demonstrate that they received different treatment from that 
received by other individuals similarly situated.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).   
 
Plaintiffs assert that the Act violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it allows 
retired law enforcement officers to possess LCMs while 
prohibiting retired military members and ordinary citizens 
from doing so.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-3(g), 2C:39-17.  
Plaintiffs have not shown that retired law enforcement officers 
are similarly situated to other New Jersey residents.  Retired 
law enforcement officers have training and experience not 
possessed by the general public.  Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 147 
(holding that retired law enforcement officers “are not 
similarly situated to the general public with respect to the 
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines banned”).  
Police officers in New Jersey must participate in firearms and 
defensive tactics training, including mandatory range and 
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classroom training, under a variety of simulated conditions.  
App. 144; see, e.g., App. 1361, 1369, 1368, 1383.  Law 
enforcement officers are also tested on a periodic basis after 
initial qualification and must re-qualify twice a year and meet 
certain shooting proficiency requirements.  App. 144-45; see 
App. 1322-410 (describing standards, requirements, and full 
courses for law enforcement firearms qualification).  Retired 
law enforcement officers must also satisfy firearms 
qualification requirements.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-6(l).  
Moreover, because the standard-issue weapon for many New 
Jersey law enforcement officers is a Glock 19 with a loaded 
fifteen round magazine, App. 116-17, these officers have 
experience carrying and using LCMs.  Thus, law enforcement 
officers, both active and retired, have training and experience 
that distinguishes them from the general public. 
   
Law enforcement officers are also different from 
members of the military.  Unlike military personnel trained for 
the battlefield, law enforcement officers are trained for and 
have experience in addressing volatile situations in both public 
streets and closed spaces, and they operate in noncombat zones 
where the Constitution and other rules apply.  App. 148-49.   
Even if some military members receive firearms training 
comparable to the training law enforcement officers receive, 
App. 140-41, the scope and nature of their training and 
experience are different, App. 141, 147-49.   
 
For these reasons, retired law enforcement officers are 
not similarly situated to retired military personnel and ordinary 
citizens, and therefore their exemption from the LCM ban does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.      
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VI 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order 
denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.        
BIBAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The Second Amendment is an equal part of the Bill of 
Rights. We must treat the right to keep and bear arms like other 
enumerated rights, as the Supreme Court insisted in Heller. We 
may not water it down and balance it away based on our own 
sense of wise policy. 554 U.S. at 634-35. 
Yet the majority treats the Second Amendment differently 
in two ways. First, it weighs the merits of the case to pick a tier 
of scrutiny. That puts the cart before the horse. For all other 
rights, we pick a tier of scrutiny based only on whether the law 
impairs the core right. The Second Amendment’s core is the 
right to keep weapons for defending oneself and one’s family 
in one’s home. The majority agrees that this is the core. So 
whenever a law impairs that core right, we should apply strict 
scrutiny, period. That is the case here.  
Second, though the majority purports to use intermediate 
scrutiny, it actually recreates the rational-basis test forbidden 
by Heller. It suggests that this record favors the government, 
but make no mistake—that is not what the District Court found. 
The majority repeatedly relies on evidence that the District 
Court did not rely on and expert testimony that the District 
Court said was “of little help.” 2018 WL 4688345, at *8. It 
effectively flips the burden of proof onto the challengers, treat-
ing both contested evidence and the lack of evidence as con-
clusively favoring the government.  
Whether strict or intermediate scrutiny applies, we should 
require real evidence that the law furthers the government’s 
aim and is tailored to that aim. But at key points, the majority 
2 
substitutes anecdotes and armchair reasoning for the concrete 
proof that we demand for heightened scrutiny anywhere else. 
New Jersey has introduced no expert study of how similar 
magazine restrictions have worked elsewhere. Nor did the Dis-
trict Court identify any other evidence, as opposed to armchair 
reasoning, that illuminated how this law will reduce the harm 
from mass shootings. Id. at *12-13. So New Jersey cannot win 
unless the burden of proof lies with the challengers. It does not.  
The majority also guts heightened scrutiny’s requirement 
of tailoring. Alternatives to this ban may be less burdensome 
and as effective. New Jersey has already gone further than most 
states. It has a preexisting fifteen-round magazine limit and a 
restrictive permitting system. These laws may already do much 
to allay its public-safety concerns. New Jersey needs to show 
that these and other measures will not suffice. 
The majority stands in good company: five other circuits 
have upheld limits on magazine sizes. These courts, like the 
New Jersey legislature, rightly worry about how best to reduce 
gun violence. But they err in subjecting the Second Amend-
ment to different, watered-down rules and demanding little if 
any proof. So I would enjoin this Act until New Jersey provides 
real evidence to satisfy its burden of proving the Act constitu-
tional. 
I. STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES TO LAWS THAT IMPAIR 
SELF-DEFENSE IN THE HOME 
Unlike the majority, I would apply strict scrutiny to any law 
that impairs the core Second Amendment right to defend one’s 
home. This law does so. And it fails strict scrutiny. 
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A. Other core constitutional rights get strict scrutiny 
The Supreme Court has not set up tiers of scrutiny for gun 
regulations. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. That may be intentional: 
many rights do not have tiers of scrutiny. E.g., Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause). But our prec-
edent mandates them for the Second Amendment, at least for 
laws that do not categorically ban commonly used weapons. 
See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96-97. 
As the majority recognizes, if we apply tiers of scrutiny, we 
apply strict scrutiny to the right’s core. Maj. Op. at 22. For 
other rights, that is the end of the question. The “bedrock prin-
ciple” of the Free Speech Clause forbids limiting speech just 
because it is “offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 414 (1989). So content-based speech restrictions get 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 412. The Free Exercise Clause was de-
signed as a bulwark against “religious persecution and intoler-
ance.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hia-
leah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). So laws that target religion or religious conduct get strict 
scrutiny. Id. at 533. And the Equal Protection Clause targets 
classifications that historically were used to discriminate. See 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995). 
So laws that classify based on race get strict scrutiny. Id. at 
235. 
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B. The Second Amendment’s core is self-defense in the 
home 
The Second Amendment merits the same level of scrutiny. 
As Heller and McDonald confirm, and the majority acknowl-
edges, its core turns on the weapon’s function and its location: 
self-defense and the home. Maj. Op. 18-19, 22. Laws that tread 
on both warrant strict scrutiny. 
Self-defense is the quintessential protected function of 
weapons. As Heller stressed, “it [i]s the central component of 
the right itself.” 554 U.S. at 599 (emphasis in original); accord 
id. at 628. Heller thus focused on laws that deprive people of 
weapons commonly used for self-defense. Id. at 624, 629. And 
McDonald focused on the history of colonists’ and freedmen’s 
defending themselves, whether from King George’s troops or 
the Ku Klux Klan. 561 U.S. at 768, 772 (majority opinion); id. 
at 857 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
Not every gun law impairs self-defense. Our precedent ap-
plies intermediate scrutiny to laws that do not affect weapons’ 
function, like serial-number requirements. Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d at 97. But for laws that do impair self-defense, strict scru-
tiny is apt. 
And the home is the quintessential place protected by the 
Second Amendment. In the home, “the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628). So the core is about us-
ing weapons in common use for self-defense in the home. 
5 
C. This Act burdens the core right 
A ban on large magazines burdens that core right. Large 
magazines, unlike machineguns, are in common use. The ban 
extends to the home. Indeed, that is the main if not only locale 
of the law, as New Jersey can already deny most people per-
mits to carry large magazines publicly. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:58-4(c). And the ban impairs using guns for self-defense. 
The government’s entire case is that smaller magazines mean 
more reloading. That may make guns less effective for ill—but 
so too for good. The government’s own police detective testi-
fied that he carries large magazines because they give him a 
tactical “advantage[ ] ,” since users must reload smaller maga-
zines more often. App. 116-18. And he admitted that “law-
abiding citizens in a gunfight” would also find them “advanta-
geous.” App. 119. So the ban impairs both criminal uses and 
self-defense.  
The law does not ban all magazines, so it is not per se un-
constitutional. But it does impair the core Second Amendment 
right. We usually would stop there. How much the law impairs 
the core or how many people use the core right that way does 
not affect the tier of scrutiny. So like any other law that burdens 
a constitutional right’s core, this law warrants strict scrutiny. 
D. The majority’s responses are unconvincing 
The majority tries to justify using intermediate scrutiny. 
But it errs twice over.  
1. Forbidden interest-balancing. First and most funda-
mentally, the majority weighs the merits of the right to possess 
large magazines. It extends a passing phrase from Marzzarella 
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into a requirement that a burden “severely burden the core Sec-
ond Amendment right to self-defense in the home” before it 
will receive strict scrutiny. Maj. Op. at 22 (emphasis added) 
(citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97); accord id. at 25. It de-
mands evidence that people commonly fire large magazines in 
self-defense. The challengers offer some data, and the govern-
ment offers different data. The majority observes that the rec-
ord is unclear on how many people fire more than ten rounds 
in self-defense. Maj. Op. at 10 & n.8. And it argues that people 
can use smaller magazines and “many other firearm options” 
anyway. Id. at 23-24; accord id. at 25, 33. 
But the Second Amendment provides a right to “keep and 
bear Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II (emphasis added). It pro-
tects possessing arms, not just firing them. So the majority 
misses a key part of the Second Amendment. The analysis can-
not turn on how many bullets are fired.  
And we never demand evidence of how severely a law bur-
dens or how many people it hinders before picking a tier of 
scrutiny. That demand is backwards and explicitly forbidden 
by Heller. We should read our precedent in keeping with the 
Supreme Court’s instructions. Polling defensive gun uses and 
alternatives to set a level of scrutiny, as the majority does, boils 
down to forbidden interest-balancing. Any gun regulation lim-
its gun use for both crime and self-defense. And any gun re-
striction other than a flat ban on guns will leave alternative 
weapons. So the majority’s test amounts to weighing benefits 
against burdens. 
 That balancing approach is a variant of the position of Jus-
tice Breyer’s dissent in Heller; the Heller majority rejected it. 
7 
Compare 554 U.S. at 634-35 (majority), with id. at 689-90 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). It makes no difference whether we 
break out the balancing into two steps or one. Maj. Op. at 26 
n.22. And looking to smaller magazines and other options is 
the same argument, adapted to magazines, that the Court dis-
missed in Heller: “It is no answer to say . . . that it is permissible 
to ban the possession of [large magazines] so long as the pos-
session of other [ ]arms [like small magazines] is allowed.” Id. 
at 629. In picking a tier of scrutiny, our job is to ask only 
whether the ban extends to the home and impairs the gun’s self-
defense function. 
Otherwise, we put the cart before the horse. Deciding the 
severity of the burden before picking a tier of scrutiny is decid-
ing the merits first. It is backwards. That upends Heller’s care-
ful approach. The Supreme Court insisted that the Second 
Amendment has already made the basic policy choice for us. 
Id. at 634-36. By enacting it, the Framers decided that the right 
to keep and bear arms is “really worth insisting upon.” Id. at 
634 (emphasis in original). So the Court needed no data on how 
many people wield handguns defensively. It did not evaluate 
alternatives. It was enough that banning handguns impaired 
self-defense in the home. Id. at 628. 
That is how we approach other constitutional rights. The 
level of scrutiny for speech restrictions does not change if 
speech is unpopular or hateful. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 
443, 458 (2011). Nor does it change if a content-based burden 
is modest. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224-
27 (2015). Our scrutiny of classifications does not depend on 
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how many people the law burdens. See United States v. Vir-
ginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34, 542 (1996) (VMI) (noting that 
“most women would not choose VMI”). So it should not 
change our scrutiny of gun laws, no matter how unclear the 
record is on how many times “more than ten shots were used 
in self-defense.” Maj. Op. at 10 & n.8.  
Nor does the availability of alternatives lower our tier of 
scrutiny. Bans on flag-burning get strict scrutiny even though 
there are other ways to express one’s views. See Johnson, 491 
U.S. at 412. Racial preferences for college applicants face the 
toughest scrutiny even though applicants can always go to 
other colleges. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 
(2003). The availability of alternatives bears on whether the 
government satisfies strict scrutiny, not on whether strict scru-
tiny applies in the first place. We focus on whether the govern-
ment can achieve its compelling goal by using other re-
strictions, not on whether the rights-holder still has other ave-
nues to exercise the right. 
So the only question is whether a law impairs the core of a 
constitutional right, whatever the right may be. Any other ap-
proach puts the cart before the horse by weighing the merits of 
the case to pick a tier of scrutiny. 
2. Limiting Heller’s core to handgun bans. Second, though 
it denies it, the majority effectively cabins Heller’s core to bans 
on handguns. Compare Maj. Op. at 19 n.14 (denying that Hel-
ler is so limited), with id. at 23-24 (stressing that this law, un-
like the law in Heller, “does not take firearms out of the hands 
of law-abiding citizens” and leaves them with “many other 
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firearm options”). But that is like cabining VMI to military in-
stitutes. Heller never limited its reasoning to handguns or com-
plete bans, and for good reason. No other right works that way. 
Strict scrutiny applies to laws that burden speech or religion 
even if they do not nearly eliminate the right to speak or be-
lieve. E.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017); Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225-
27.  
People commonly possess large magazines to defend them-
selves and their families in their homes. That is exactly why 
banning them burdens the core Second Amendment right. For 
any other right, that would be the end of our analysis; for the 
Second Amendment, the majority demands something much 
more severe. 
So I would apply strict scrutiny to this Act, at least insofar 
as it limits keeping magazines to defend one’s home. But as 
discussed below, the government has not shown that this Act 
can survive even intermediate scrutiny. 
II. EVEN UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, ON THIS REC-
ORD, THE LAW FAILS 
Our precedent holds that intermediate scrutiny governs lim-
its on weapons outside the home. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
436 (3d Cir. 2013). The majority purports to apply that test. 
But its version is watered down—searching in theory but fee-
ble in fact. It takes a record on which the District Court did not 
rely and construes everything in favor of the government, ef-
fectively flipping the burden onto the challengers. Even then, 
its analysis boils down to anecdotes and armchair reasoning. 
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And the majority overlooks tailoring. None of that would be 
enough for other rights. I would apply true intermediate scru-
tiny, demanding evidence for the government’s assertions and 
some showing of tailoring. Under either strict or true interme-
diate scrutiny, the law fails. 
A. Intermediate scrutiny must be searching, not feeble 
Though the Supreme Court has yet to specify a tier of scru-
tiny for gun laws, it forbade rational-basis review. Heller, 554 
U.S. at 628 n.27. So our scrutiny must not be so deferential that 
it boils down to a rational-basis test. 
Intermediate scrutiny requires much more. As the majority 
concedes, the government bears the burden of proof. Maj. Op. 
at 30 n.24; Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353 (Ambro, J., controlling 
opinion). This is true even for preliminary injunctions. Gonza-
les v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 429 (2006). It must prove that the Act advances a 
substantial governmental interest. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98. 
And though we may give some deference to the legislature’s 
predictive judgments, those judgments must rest on real, hard 
evidence. Compare Drake, 724 F.3d at 436-37 (“accord[ing] 
substantial deference to the [legislature’s] predictive judg-
ments”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 (1973) (castigating govern-
ment’s armchair, supposedly empirical reasoning unsupported 
by “concrete evidence”).  
It is not enough to base sex classifications on armchair rea-
soning. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689-90 (applying intermediate 
scrutiny); see VMI, 518 U.S. at 541-43 (same). So that should 
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not be enough for gun laws either. Almost any gun law would 
survive an armchair approach; there are always plausible rea-
sons to think that limiting guns will hinder criminals. That 
starts to look like rational-basis review.  
The government must also prove that its law does not “bur-
den more [conduct] than is reasonably necessary.” Marz-
zarella, 614 F.3d at 98. To be sure, intermediate scrutiny does 
not demand the least restrictive means possible. But the gov-
ernment may not impair a constitutional right simply because 
doing so is convenient. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 
2534 (2014). It must make some showing that alternatives will 
not work. Id. at 2540. True intermediate scrutiny thus requires 
proof of tailoring. 
So we must require that the government introduce substan-
tial proof. We may not reflexively defer to its justifications. 
And we must look for tailoring. None of these requirements is 
met here. 
B. The government has not met its burden of proof 
New Jersey has not met its burden to overcome intermedi-
ate scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny. True, the government has 
a compelling interest in reducing the harm from mass shoot-
ings. No one disputes that. But New Jersey has failed to show 
how the ban advances its interest. Nor does it provide evidence 
of tailoring.  
1. The record lacks evidence that magazine restrictions re-
duce mass-shooting deaths. This record lacks any evidence ty-
ing that interest to banning large magazines. The reader could 
be forgiven for any surprise at that statement: the majority acts 
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as if the record abounds in this evidence. But that is not what 
the District Court found. That Court offered three rationales for 
upholding the ban. None of them withstands scrutiny. 
First, the District Court, like the majority here, reasoned 
that people can still own many, smaller magazines. 2018 WL 
4688345, at *13. But Heller rejected that very argument. See 
554 U.S. at 629.  
Second, the District Court stressed its deference to the leg-
islature’s judgment about the local needs of densely populated 
urban states. 2018 WL 4688345, at *13. In doing so, it relied 
not on the majority opinion in Heller but on Justice Breyer’s 
dissent. Id. (quoting 554 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
That citation alone shows how the deferential decision below 
conflicts with our governing instructions from above. 
Third, the District Court detailed the testimony and evi-
dence of all four expert witnesses. But it then “f[ou]nd the ex-
pert testimony is of little help in its analysis.” Id. at *8. It found 
that evidence “of little help” in figuring out how the law would 
impair self-defense and how it would reduce the harm from 
mass shootings. Id. So none of this satisfied the government’s 
burden of proof.  
The only expert finding on which the District Court could 
rely was a vague and general one: “[T]he expert testimony es-
tablished that there is some delay associated with reloading, 
which may provide an opportunity for potential victims to es-
cape or for a bystander to intercede and somehow stop a 
shooter.” Id. at *12. In other words, it rested on the armchair 
proposition that smaller magazines force shooters to pause 
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more often to reload. When shooters must reload, potential vic-
tims should have more chances to escape or tackle the shooter. 
This speculation is plausible. But the Court cited no concrete 
causal link between that plausible speculation and its effect on 
mass-shooting deaths. 
So with no support from the District Court, the majority 
digs through the record to link large magazines with the harm 
from mass shootings. By construing a record that the District 
Court found unhelpful in favor of the government, the majority 
effectively flips the burden of proof onto the challengers. It 
cites many portions of the record never mentioned by the Dis-
trict Court. It details the rise of mass shootings. It cites reports 
of mass shootings to show that people can escape when the 
shooter stops shooting. And it quotes a police chief as evidence 
that smaller magazines require more reloading.  
The District Court was admirably clear about the state of 
the record. It did not rely on any of this “anecdotal evidence.” 
Compare 2018 WL 4688345, at *3 (noting “anecdotal evi-
dence”), with id. at *12 (not relying on it). And rightly so. The 
majority cannot tell us how many mass shooters use large mag-
azines. It cannot tell us how often mass shooters use magazines 
with ten to fifteen rounds. And it cannot tell us any specifics 
about the increase in reload time. In short, the majority has no 
record citation, let alone evidence relied on by the District 
Court, that specifically links large magazines to mass-shooting 
deaths.  
It has no citation because there isn’t one. The government’s 
own experts never examined the causal link between these 
magazines and crime. Its best evidence came from a lone CNN 
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article that mentioned a study linking large magazines to mass 
shootings. But the government never introduced the actual 
study, the expert, or the underlying data. Nor was the study 
ever peer-reviewed. Without examination or cross-examina-
tion of the study, we cannot rely on it.  
So to link reports of mass shootings to generalities about 
reload times, the majority resorts to saying: “[T]here is some 
delay associated with reloading, which may provide an oppor-
tunity for potential victims to escape or for a bystander to in-
tercede.” Maj. Op. at 29-30 (quoting 2018 WL 4688345, at 
*12). With no support for this analysis, the majority’s case thus 
boils down to the same armchair reasoning that the District 
Court relied on, plus some “anecdotal evidence.” 2018 WL 
4688345, at *3. Though the majority insists otherwise, finding 
for the government on this basis alone effectively flips the bur-
den of proof. Maj. Op. at 30 n.24. And the majority offers no 
limiting principle: its logic would equally justify a one-round 
magazine limit.  
This reasoning would be enough for rational-basis review. 
And it could be enough for intermediate scrutiny too. But the 
government has produced no substantial evidence of this link. 
It could compile that evidence by, for example, studying other 
jurisdictions that have restricted magazine size. Until it does 
so, we should grant the preliminary injunction. 
2. There is no evidence of tailoring. The majority does not 
even demand evidence of tailoring. But tailoring is not limited 
to the First Amendment, as our precedent makes clear. Marz-
zarella, 614 F.3d at 98. Tailoring is fundamental to intermedi-
ate scrutiny, wherever applied. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534; 
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Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 & n.13 (1979) (ille-
gitimacy). 
If anything, the evidence shows that other effective laws are 
already on the books. In a footnote, the majority suggests that 
these other laws prove tailoring. Maj. Op. at 36-37 n.28. But 
far from it. If other laws already restrict guns, New Jersey has 
to show that the laws already on the books will not suffice. See 
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2538-39. It has not done so.  
To start, since 1990 New Jersey has banned magazines that 
hold more than fifteen bullets. The ban affects everyone. The 
challengers do not contest that ban. And there is no evidence 
of its efficacy, one way or the other. Though the government 
cites mass shootings involving large magazines, these shooters 
often used magazines with thirty or more rounds. So we do not 
know if a ten-round limit is tailored. 
New Jersey also has a may-issue permitting law, requiring 
people to show a “justifiable need” before they may carry 
handguns outside the home. Drake, 724 F.3d at 428. We have 
upheld that law. Id. at 440. So the only people who can carry 
large magazines outside the home are those who face “specific 
threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special dan-
ger” to their lives. Id. at 428 (quoting N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 13:54-2.4(d)(1)). This limited universe of people includes 
abused women, those being stalked, and those fleeing gangs. 
Banning large magazines thus harms those who need the Sec-
ond Amendment most. 
Given its may-issue law, the government offers nothing to 
explain why this added ban is necessary, let alone tailored to 
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its interests. If only those with a justifiable need can carry these 
magazines, why is New Jersey’s law not tailored enough al-
ready? The government’s only answer is that the may-issue re-
quirement does not currently extend to the home. And the ma-
jority’s only response is that many previously law-abiding cit-
izens commit crime. But these arguments run up against strict 
scrutiny in the home. At most, they would warrant extending a 
may-issue permit requirement to the home, rather than banning 
large magazines entirely. And once again, the majority lacks a 
limiting principle: since anyone could commit crime, the gov-
ernment could forbid anyone to have a gun.  
3. The majority muddles defensive gun uses. Instead of a 
real tailoring analysis, the majority again demands evidence of 
how often people use large magazines for self-defense. But tai-
loring does not depend on how many times a right is impaired. 
The majority cannot even decide what the evidence shows. 
In places, it concedes that large magazines “have also been 
used for self-defense.” Maj. Op. at 10; accord id. at 21. If so, 
this undercuts the ban. Elsewhere, it notes that the record is 
unclear on how often people shoot more than ten rounds in self-
defense. Maj. Op. at 10 & n.8; accord id. at 33-34 n.27. If so, 
then New Jersey has not borne its burden of proof. Relying on 
unclearness amounts to flipping the burden of proof onto the 
challengers. Lastly, the majority most often concludes—even 
in the same breath—that large magazines are not appropriate 
for self-defense. Maj. Op. at 10-11, 23. But that is not what the 
District Court found. That Court specifically observed that the 
evidence “failed to clearly convey . . . the extent to which the 
law will impede gun owners from defending themselves.” 2018 
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WL 4688345, at *8. These contradictory assertions cannot bol-
ster the law, nor satisfy the government’s burden of proof. 
4. The majority’s watered-down “intermediate scrutiny” 
is really rational-basis review. This law would never survive 
the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court in 
speech or sex-discrimination cases. Those cases demand com-
pelling evidence and tailoring. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 
2534; VMI, 518 U.S. at 524. 
In a footnote, the majority candidly admits that it is not ap-
plying intermediate scrutiny as we know it. It concedes that its 
approach does not come from the First Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment (or any other constitutional provision, 
for that matter). Maj. Op. at 34-35 n.28. It offers only one rea-
son: guns are dangerous. Id. (quoting and relying on the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1126). But as Heller 
explained, other rights affect public safety too. The Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments often set dangerous criminals 
free. The First Amendment protects hate speech and advocat-
ing violence. The Supreme Court does not treat any other right 
differently when it creates a risk of harm. And it has repeatedly 
rejected treating the Second Amendment differently from other 
enumerated rights. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35; McDonald, 561 
U.S. at 787-91. The Framers made that choice for us. We must 
treat the Second Amendment the same as the rest of the Bill of 
Rights. 
So the majority’s version of intermediate scrutiny is too lax. 
It cannot fairly be called intermediate scrutiny at all. Interme-
diate scrutiny requires more concrete and specific proof before 
the government may restrict any constitutional right, period. 
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* * * * * 
I realize that the majority’s opinion aligns with those of five 
other circuits. But Heller overruled nine, underscoring our in-
dependent duty to evaluate the law ourselves. And unlike most 
other states, New Jersey has layered its law on top of not only 
a previous magazine restriction, but also a may-issue permit 
law that greatly limits public carrying. Those laws may have 
prevented or limited gun violence. That cuts against the law’s 
necessity and its tailoring. 
The majority’s concerns are understandable. Guns kill peo-
ple. States should be able to experiment with reasonable gun 
laws to promote public safety. And they need not wait for mass 
shootings before acting. The government’s and the majority’s 
position may thus be wise policy. But that is not for us to de-
cide. The Second Amendment is an equal part of the Bill of 
Rights. And the Supreme Court has repeatedly told us not to 
treat it differently.  
So we must apply strict scrutiny to protect people’s core 
right to defend themselves and their families in their homes. 
That means holding the government to a demanding burden of 
proof. Here, the government has offered no concrete evidence 
that magazine restrictions have saved or will save potential vic-
tims. Nor has it made any showing of tailoring. 
I would thus enjoin the law and remand to let the govern-
ment provide evidence that the Act will advance its interests 
and is tailored to do so. On remand, the government would be 
free to introduce real studies of any causal evidence that large-
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magazine limits prevent harm from mass shootings or gun vi-
olence in general. It could also introduce proof of tailoring and 
discuss its existing laws and alternatives. The challengers 
could try to rebut those studies. And we could then find 
whether the government has met its burden to justify this law. 
But it has not yet done that. So the law may well irreparably 
harm the challengers by infringing their constitutional rights. I 
respectfully dissent. 
